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Introduction  
There are several regional blocks with their own organizations. The most well-known of the  
regional blocks is the European Union, the regional bloc of Europe but there are also blocks in e.g. 
Africa (African Union), Southeast Asia (Association Of Southeast Asian Nations) and in South America 
(Mercado Común del Sur). The reasons why these regional blocks were created were economical and 
sometimes because of security as well. Another reason why the countries in these regions decided to 
form a block together is that they are situated next to each other. 
The success of a regional block is dependent on its member states. The member states need  
to be willing to work together and in some cases willing to sacrifice either money or a part of their 
sovereignty. Governments in Europe are as democratic governments dependent on the approval of 
its citizens. As people, citizens are more willing to sacrifice for people they feel they have a 
connection to. People feel a connection to people they share an identity with. An attack in Paris gets 
more attention in the West than an attack in Africa because the French people are European and 
Western. 
In this thesis, I want to look at the ways that the European Union and the Association Of  
Southeast Asian Nations have tried to promote a regional identity and in how far they have been 
successful with creating an awareness of that identity amongst the citizens of its member states. I 
will try to determine if the successes and failures can be attributed to the methods that are used by 
the institutions of the European Union and the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations to promote 
the region identities. When looking at the ways that these organizations have tried to promote a 
regional identity, I will look at how they have tried to make people living in the region feel like they 
have a shared identity. I will look at projects and policies specifically aimed at the people living in the 
region. I will not look at how these organizations have tried to project an regional image towards the 
countries outside the region. 
The reason why I decided to make a comparison between two regions is that I wanted to  
compare ways in which institutions of different regional organizations have tried to create and 
promote a regional identity. Why I have chosen to compare the institutions of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations with the institutions of the European Union is partially because this regional 
organization is one of the most successful regional organizations outside of Europe and partially 
because in the past, the Association of Southeast Asian has in the past indicated that it wanted to 
integrate the region more. One of the ways that a regional block can be more integrated is through a 
regional identity. When people feel like they share an identity with someone they are more willing 
make sacrifices for that person. This makes integration easier. The 2020 vision even stated that the 
organization wanted a common currency in the region. This also requires the willingness to sacrifice 
according to the Optimal Currency Area theory.1 
My main research question is: How have the institutions of the European Union and the  
Association Of Southeast Asian Nations tried to promote regional identities and have their plans 
been successful? My sub-questions are: What do I mean when I talk about identity? How do we know 
that the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations want to promote regional 
identities? How have regional institutions tried to promote regional identities? Is there a difference 
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 ‘Optimal Currency Area’, Investopedia, Accessed on July 11, 2017, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/optimal-currency-area.asp 
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in the methods used by the regional institutions in Europe and the regional institutions in Southeast 
Asia? To what extent have such efforts contributed to whatever sense of identity exists? 
 
Methodology  
To answer these questions, I will look at documents of the European Union and the  
Association Of Southeast Asian Nations. I will look at articles about what connects the people living in 
Europe, e.g. Christianity and the Eurovision Song Contest. I will also read articles about the 
awareness of a regional identity amongst the people who live in the regional blocs and analyze the 
results of surveys that try to measure the same thing. For theories about identity, I will look at 
articles and books that have been written on the subject by scholars. 
 
Theory 
 
As the subject of this thesis will be about identities and what institutions have done to  
promote them, the International Relations theory that will be my instrument with which I will 
conduct this research is social constructivism. The theory of constructivism in the broader sense 
states that countries can work together, which makes it different from the realist theory, which 
states that countries fight each other for power constantly and that is why they cannot work 
successfully together. Followers of the social constructivist theory believe that the way that states 
behave is influenced by their culture, identity and prominent ideologies within the country. With this, 
they refute that states are driven solely by materialistic interests. The theory of social constructivism 
states that an object only exists when people talk about the object. A bread is only a bread when 
people agree to call it that. When it comes to international relations, this theory believes that shared 
ideas and norms influence state behavior. It also states that the present global order is a social 
construct.2 
Identities are in part created by interaction, according to social constructivists. This also goes  
for international identities. Identities are not fixed and change throughout history. Identities may 
grow to include people that were previously the ‘others.’ 3  State identities are not static but fluid. 
The reason why this is is because an identity is a social fact. The fact only exists because people have 
agreed to give a certain phenomenon a name. Often they also need human institutions to give it a 
name.4  
Social constructivists believe that agents do shape international politics. Unlike realists, social  
constructivists believe that materialistic goals are not the only things that influence politics.5 As the 
realist theory believes that the project of regionalism is doomed to fail because materialistic driven 
states cannot work together, this theory does not fit with a thesis about institutions and how they 
have tried to promote a regional identity. 
The hypotheses that I will be testing in this thesis is that the institutions of the European  
                                                          
2
 Tsvetko V. Karkalanov, ‘The Intrinsic Explanatory Value Of Social Constructivism In International Telations 
Theory’, Comparative Politics Russia, 7.4(25), (2016),  pp. 6-7 
3
Luciana Alexandra Ghica, ‘Beyond regional integration?: social constructivism, regional cohesiveness and the 
regionalism puzzle’, Studia Politica : Romanian Political Science Review, 13.4, (2013), pp. 736 
4
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Philosophical Economsics, vi.2, pp. 52-53 
5
 Joseph Jupille; James Caporaso; Jeffrey Checkel; Joseph Jupille, ‘Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, 
Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union’, Comparative Political Studies, 36.1-2, (2003),  pp. 14 
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Union and the institutions of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have tried to create and 
promote regional identities in their respective regions but have not been successful. The reason why 
I do not think they have been successful is that I believe that not a lot of citizens of the European 
Union feel like they share an European identity. The same goes for the people living in Southeast 
Asia. This means that the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have not 
been successful with their attempts to promote a regional identity. 
 
State of the field 
 
In this section of the paper, I will look at what has already been written about regional  
identity in the European Union and Southeast Asia and the part that regional institutions have played 
in creating such an identity. First, I will look at what has been written about the promotion the 
European identity. In the next section, I will look at what has been said about the Southeast Asian 
identity. I will finish with discussing the research that has been done on the comparison between 
European and Southeast Asian regional identities. 
 
The European Identity  
 
Most of the articles that I will discuss in this section of the State Of The Field chapter can be  
divided into two groups. One group consists of articles that look at positive, internal processes of 
identity formation. The second group consists of articles that look at 'othering', or regional 
organizations finding a shared point of negative external reference. 
The first source that I will discuss is a book written by Thomas Pederson and is titled ‘When  
Cultures Become Politics’. European Identity In Perspective’. This book belongs in the first group. In 
it, Pederson discusses the personal choice when it comes to the European Identity. Pederson does 
not look at institutions but rather at ideas. It looks at the sources of national identity and the possible 
sources of an European identity. It also looks whether or not there is a common identity in Europe. 
Pederson sees the question about an European identity as a ‘launching pad’ for questions about the 
nature and the sources of human identity. Whether or not a sense of a common identity is needed if 
the European Union wants to function is also discussed in the book.6 It touches on some of the topics 
that I will discuss in this thesis. The first such topic is whether or not people in Europe see themselves 
as European. Pederson also looks at the construction of ‘common unifying symbols’ by the 
institutions of the European Union and the limitations of these attempts.7 The book was written in 
2008. Pederson concludes that the source for a common regional identity is different depending on if 
someone is a political elite or a citizen. He is of the opinion that there is indeed a common European 
identity that is based on ‘ideas with a universal dimension’, democracy, individuality and a ‘unique 
merger of rational and romanticist thinking’.  
In the book titled ‘Imagining Europe as a Global Player: The Ideological Construction of a New  
European Identity within the EU ‘ Christoffer Kølvraa looks at how the European Union institutions 
have tried to make the citizens feel emotionally attached to the Union.  The European Union does 
this by emphasizing European values in their political texts.8 The main focus is on the European 
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7
 Ibid, pp. 26-27 
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Neighbourhood Policy.9 It does not compare the strategy of the European Union institutions with 
that of other regional organizations.  
The second article that I will discuss was written by Soetkin Verheagen and Marc Hooghe and  
it has as title the question which the article tries to answer, which is: Does more knowledge about 
the European Union lead to a stronger European identity? They use the ‘Civic and Citizenship 
Education Study 2009’ that was collected among adolescence in 21 member states to answer this 
question. Their conclusion is that knowledge has a significant but limited effect on the strength of the 
European identity. Economic benefits and trust in national institutions have a greater influence. 
According to this article, it is stated in European political documents that better knowledge will lead 
to a stronger European identity.10 One can conclude that European Union institutions use this theory 
to promote the European identity but this is not said in so many words in the article. It is not 
concerned with which entity uses which method but rather looks at which method works and which 
does not.  
There is only one book that belongs in the second group. In the book ‘Turkey and the  
European Union: The Question of European Identity’, Selcer Öner discusses the concept of an 
European identity in relation to the dynamic between Europe and Turkey. The theory of the book is 
that the Europe and Turkey have influenced each other’s identities. In the conclusion, this theory is 
confirmed. The book was written in 2011. One chapter focuses on the European Union institutions 
and their role in the construction of an European Identity. This is, however, not the main focus. They 
also do not compare the efforts of the European Union institutions and the efforts of the institutions 
of another regional organization.11  
There is an article about the European identity that does not belong in these groups. The first  
book that does not that I will discuss is the book ‘Building Europe’ that was written by Cris Shore in 
2000. In this book, Shore looks at the top-down efforts of the European Commission to create a 
regional consciousness in Europe. It gives examples of the ways in which the European Union has 
tried to promote a regional identity. One of them is by promoting the idea of an European culture. 12  
Another is the attempts to create an European history. 13 
As can be seen above, there are different ways in which scholars have approached the  
European Identity. I will focus on what the institutions have done to promote a common European 
Identity. As the book by Cris Shore was written in 2000, I will mostly focus on what the institutions 
have done to promote the regional identity from that year onward. What one can conclude that 
researching and writing about the European Identity is popular amongst scholars. Can the same be 
said about the Southeast Asian identity? Have a lot of scholars written about it?  
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The Southeast Asian Identity  
 
In this part of the state of the field section, I will look at what scholars have written about a  
Southeast Asian identity and whether or not these scholars have also looked at the role of 
institutions in shaping and promoting this regional identity. Finding articles and books on the 
Southeast Asian identity was more difficult than finding the above-discussed articles and books on 
the European identity. One would assume that this is because the focus of scholars is usually on the 
West or that there is lesser interest in the Southeast Asian regional identity because the European 
Union is more integrated than the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. These articles can also be 
divided into the groups that I have discussed in the European identity section of this chapter. Like in 
the European identity section, I will first discuss the articles that look at internal processes.  
The first article that I will discuss is titled ‘Unity-in-Diversity? Regional Identity-building in  
Southeast Asia’ and was written by Kristina Jönsson in 2010. The aim of the paper was to look at 
regional integration and regional identity-building in Southeast Asia. Jönsson states that she wants to 
show the problems that institutions will face if they want to create a regional identity in Southeast 
Asia. She wants to do this by ‘relating the efforts of integration to the issues of multi-ethnicity, 
national identity-building and multicultural societies in times of globalization.’ The problems that the 
institutions will face when they want to advance regional integration are: diversity because of new 
members, the idea of non-interference and, fragmentation because of globalization. This article does 
look at what the ASEAN has done to promote a regional identity but this is only a small aspect of the 
paper. It does also provide a theory about through which means a common identity can be 
reinforced.14  
The next article that I will discuss is written by Amitav Acharya in 2005 and is titled: ‘Do  
norms and identity matter? Community and power in Southeast Asia’s regional order.’ This article 
looks at the contribution of Michael Leifer to the study of Southeast Asian regionalism. This article 
looks explicitly at the role of the ASEAN. Acharya looks primarily at what  Michael Leifer has said 
about what he himself has written and then reacts to Leifer’s reactions. He does discuss ASEAN and 
the part that the organization has played in the Southeast regional identity but he does not give 
examples. The article is a reaction to Michael Leifer, not the result of research into the efforts of the 
ASEAN institutions to create a Southeast Asian identity.15  
The article by Azirah Hashim, Jagdish Kaur and Tan Siew Kuang titled ‘Identity regionalism  
and English as an ASEAN lingua franca’ looks at the effect of English as a lingua franca on the 
Southeast Asian identity. They believe that by using English as the language in which the various 
representatives of the ASEAN member states communicate, it helps foster an ‘ASEAN identity’. It also 
looks at what the ASEAN has done to ensure that more people in Southeast Asia learn to speak 
English. According to the article, the ASEAN choose to use English as a lingua franca because of 
research that has been done in Europe on the subject. It is not clear if this research was also used by 
the regional institutions in the region of Europe. It also only looks at one of the strategies used by the 
ASEAN to promote a regional identity, namely, the promotion of English in the member states.16  
Amitav Acharya has written an article titled:  ‘Imagined Proximities: The Making and  
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Kristina Jönsson, ‘Unity-in-Diversity? Regional Identity-building in Southeast Asia,’ 
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 29, 2,  (2010), pp. 48 
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 Amitav Acharya, ‘ Do norms and identity matter? Community and power in Southeast Asia's regional order,‘ 
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Unmaking of Southeast Asia as a Region’.  In it, he focuses on regionalism as ‘the chief agent in 
regional construction.’  Acharya looks at the history of the concept of Southeast Asia as well as the 
then current claim that Southeast Asia is a region. The article briefly discusses strategies of the 
ASEAN to promote a regional identity. One of the strategies was to promote a new way that the 
member states were going to handle international relations. This new way came with new rules of 
behavior that included:  ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of states, non-use of force, and 
pacific settlement of disputes’.  Another strategy was to create a ‘common policy of inclusion and 
exclusion into the regional space’. It also discusses why the ASEAN was interested in creating a 
regional identity. It was an attempt to change the Cold War perspective that the West had of the 
region as well as to achieve more regional autonomy. It does not look at if the citizens in Southeast 
Asia feel that they have a Southeast Asian identity. It does not compare the attempts of the ASEAN 
institutions with the attempts of the EU institutions to create a regional identity.17  
The last article that belongs in the internal processes group that I will discuss is titled ‘ASEAN  
10: The Political and Cultural Dimensions of Southeast Asian Unity’ and was written by  Michael R.J. 
Vatikiotis in 1999. It is an essay in which it is argued that the notion of a regional identity is shallow in 
Southeast Asia. As the ASEAN expands, the regional identity is endangered. It does discuss the 
attempts or rather the lack thereof of ASEAN to create a regional identity.18  It does not look at the 
sense of regional belonging among the citizens of the member states.  
Only one article belongs in the second group that focusses on negative external references.  
In the article ‘How and Why Interaction Matters: ASEAN’s Regional Identity and Human Rights’, 
Maria-Gabriela Manea looks at human rights and their role in the formation of a regional identity in 
Southeast Asia. Because of external pressure regarding human rights, the ASEAN was forced to 
‘define itself with regard to human rights.’19  
 
Comparing Europe and Southeast Asia 
 
There was only one article that I could find that compares the European Union with the  
Association of Southeast Asian Nations when it comes to regional identity. It focuses on negative 
external references. In his article: ‘Reshaping Regional Identities through Enlargement: An EU/ASEAN 
Comparison’, François Bafoil looks at past enlargements of both regional blocs and the effect of these 
enlargements on the power balance between the regional organization and the member states. 
Regional identity is only introduced in the second half of the article. In this part of the paper, he does 
not look at the different strategies that the European Union institutions have used to promote a 
regional identity, Bafoil only looks at the effect of enlargements on the perception of a regional 
identity when it comes to the European Union. With the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, he 
only looks at why ASEAN has become what it is and if it functions properly.20 According to him, the 
enlargements of both regional blocks have ‘re-legitimised the collective enterprise’.21 
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The question of identity  
 
Before I look at what the regional institutions have done to promote or create a regional  
identity, I will discuss what I mean when I talk about identity. According to the Merriam-Webster 
dictionary, identity is: ‘the distinguishing character or personality of an individual’ or ‘the relation 
established by psychological identification’.22 The first definition only works for the identity of an 
individual, as is stated in the definition itself. The second definition works also with social identities. 
Social identity one of the many kinds of different forms of identity.  
For the purpose of this thesis, I distinguish between two levels of identities. On the first level  
are individual identities, which are identities that belong to individuals, and social identities which 
belong to a group of human beings. These group identities can be based on family, choir, school or 
book club. On the second level are state or interstate identities. These interstate identities can be 
based on sex, religion, and region. People who are fans of a certain TV show also have a shared 
identity that crosses borders. These fans even refer to themselves as belonging to a certain 
community. The identities on both levels are based on what makes the individual or the group 
unique. In order to be unique, othering takes place. Othering is the process with which ‘the Self is 
distinguished from other people’. These people are considered different from the individual or the 
group.23  
 
The quest for regional identity  
 
In this chapter, I want to look at how we know that the regional organizations in Europe and  
Southeast Asia want to promote a regional identity and why they want to do this. What are the 
regional institutions in Europe and Southeast Asia and what have they done to promote a regional 
identity? But before I go into specifics, I will first look at what the theories are on how regional 
identities are established.  For an identity to develop, there needs to be some form of othering but 
the question is how big of a part othering plays in the formation of regional identities? 
According to Bahar Rumelili, a constructivist scholar distinguishes regional identities that  
focus on the past of the region and regional identities that emphasize the difference between the 
region and the states that are its neighbors. According to Rumelili, Arash Abizadeh argues that 
collective identities do not even need othering. It is enough for the individuals to recognize that they 
have a common identity. Rumelili states that Abizadeh looks to prove that a collective identity can 
encompass the whole of the human race.24 One could argue that a collective identity of the human 
race does actually need othering but from other animals this time. Othering is important to the 
creation of an identity, both for individual identities as well as collective identities. The European 
identity is used as an example of an identity that did not need othering to come about. The theory 
that is put forward in this book is that regional identities can be established through looking at the 
past of the region or looking at what distinguishes the nations within the region from those that are 
on the outside.  
Viatcheslav Morozov and Bahar Rumelili are of the opinion that the Other plays a more  
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significant part in shaping a regional identity. According to them, most constructivists look at the role 
of the other through the eyes of the region that considers those countries as Other. They give all the 
agency to the region and according to Morozov and Rumelili, this is the wrong approach.25 Those 
countries also have certain ideas and associations when it comes to the region. These associations 
also influence the identity formation of the region. Other scholars, according to Morozov and 
Rumelili, only look at how the countries outside the region react to the identity of the region and 
how this reaction influences the regional identity in turn. Morozov and Rumelili believe that the 
other countries influence the regional identity from the start.26 Aside from shining light on the agency 
of a region’s other, Morozov and Rumelili also want to put forward that the relationship between the 
region and the other does not have to be antagonistic.27  
The consensus among the scholars seems to be that regional identity can be established by  
the emphasis of the things that the states in the region have in common in contrast with the states 
that are outside the region. It is the amount of agency that the states outside the region have when 
looking at the formation of the regional identity that the scholars do not agree upon. In this, the 
theories of regional identity formation and national identity formation differ. When I read the article 
and books about the rise of nationalism that I discussed in the previous chapter, there is no mention 
of the Other or Othering. When looking at why nationalism emerged, scholars tend to be focused on 
the relationship between the state and the citizens of the nation state. When the Other does come 
into play it is not named. Scholars only discuss which shared characteristics has made the citizens 
feel like they belong in the same community. But even though Othering is not named, it does play a 
part in the theories about the emergence of nationalism. Like I discussed in the chapter about 
identity, the formation of identity is dependent on Othering. By emphasizing uniqueness, one needs 
to emphasize differences. An national identity cannot emerge of there is no difference between 
different states or groups of people.  
There are also scholars who look at why regionalism has developed without looking at the  
process of Othering. In her article ‘Unity-in-Diversity? Regional Identity-building in Southeast Asia’, 
Kristina Jönsson looks at the different theories about why regionalism has developed. She also talks 
about through which means a sense of a common identity can be developed. The means she 
proposes is conflict resolutions. These conflicts may be about political, economic or territorial 
issues.28  
Now that I have looked at the theories about the creation of regional identities, I will now  
look at what has been written about how the regional identities of Europe and Southeast Asia 
specifically can be created. As can be read on the European identity section of the state of the field 
chapter of this thesis, there have been a couple of scholars who have written about the European 
identity and the Southeast Asian identity.  
In sociology, according to Ettore Recchi, scholars link collective identities with the exposure  
to influential messages. These messages can be distributed through discourse and interactions.29 In 
his article, Recchi looks at two theories on the formation of an European identity. He discusses two 
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theories. The first one, he calls the ‘culturalist model.’30 According to this model,  Europeanizing 
messages play an important part in the creation of a European identity. The theory is that if 
individuals are exposed to these messages at an early age, they will be more likely to identify as 
European.31 The second theory he calls the ‘structuralist model’. According to this theory, the 
content of the messages are not important but the interactions are.32 Even without talking about an 
European identity, through interactions, people will identify with Europe by themselves.  
Another scholar who looks at the influence of communication on the European identity is one who 
was discussed in the state of the field section of this thesis. Gemma Scalise is of the opinion that 
transnational networks have a big influence on the European identity.33 As can be read in the state of 
the field section, these networks emerge because of globalization. Scalise believes that the European 
identity is a reaction to globalization.  
In their article, Morozov and Rumelili also look at the construction of the European identity.  
According to them, the construction takes place on global, pan-European, national, (sub) regional 
and local levels through ‘discursive practices’. The parties involved in this discourse are situated 
inside but also outside Europe. In the discourses outside Europe, Europe is viewed as the Other. The 
discourse between the parties inside Europe and the parties outside Europe help shape the European 
identity.34 The European identity is a constantly in flux, being reshaped by the parties outside and 
inside Europe.  
Ellen Quintelier, Soetkin Verhaegen, and Marc Hooghe have looked at a more specific form of  
communication and its influence on the European identity. They have looked at the influence of 
communication within families and its influence on the perception of an European identity. 
Communication within the family is not the only influence on an individual’s identification with an 
European identity but it does play a part in the process.35  
There are other characteristics or experiences shared amongst the European countries that  
may account for a sense of shared identity. Values that were created during the period of the Roman 
Empire together with the values that have their origin in the Enlightenment are fundamental to the 
creation of the European identity. These values are: the division of state and church, Sovereignty of 
the people and the trias politica36. These values have spread throughout Europe together with 
Christianity and established a shared identity.37 These values are also the values that the European 
Union tries to promote. Member states who do not use these values when implementing their 
policies are punished (Poland)38 and prospective member states who do the same, are refused 
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membership (Turkey).39 According to Vera Slavtcheva-Petkova, studies have shown that people with 
higher education  and ‘social status’ have a ‘more positive attitude towards Europe.’ 40 In this thesis I 
will look at what the European Union has done to promote the sense of an European identity, which 
includes amongst the people who are not a part of the elite.  
Anthony Reid believes that there is a sense of a shared identity in Southeast Asia because of  
communication. Because there was communication within the region throughout history, a regional 
identity has developed that the people living in the region believe they share. The negative 
perception of the countries that are outside Southeast Asia  has also influenced the regional identity 
formation according to Reid.41 Azirah Hashim, Jagdish Kaur, and Tan Siew Kuang look at more recent 
communication and its influence on the Southeast Asian identity. Their focus is on the use of English 
as a lingua franca. They believe that using English as the language with which the Association Of 
Southeast Asian Nations member states communicate, helps foster a regional identity.42 By using a 
language that is not the first language of any member state within the association, a more level 
playing field is created, which in turn could prevent hostility between the member states. If the 
member states do not get the impression that there is an hierarchy, there are more willing to work 
together. And if everybody speaks English, they can communicate with each other. It makes it easier 
to work together.  
Christopher Roberts believes that the experiences of the elites of the region during the  
Second World War have played an important part in creating a regional identity in Southeast Asia. 
These experiences were the effects of colonialism and the conflicts within the states after they had 
gained independence. Before independence, there was no regional identity.43  
Another scholar who believes that Othering has played an important part in the creation of  
the Southeast Asian identity is Amitav Acharya. The countries that are considered the Others of 
Southeast Asia by Acharya are China, India, and Japan. What makes Southeast Asia different from 
these countries is the many cultures that exist within the region. These many cultures form one 
culture and this mixed culture is one of the cornerstones of the Southeast Asian identity.44  
In the introduction section of this thesis, I have stated that in this thesis I want to look at the  
parts that the institutions of the European Union and the institutions of the Association Of Southeast 
Asian Nations have done to promote regional identity. I will discuss my findings in the remainder of 
this chapter. But before I look at what the institutions have done, I will first look at what I mean 
when I talk about institutions.  
When one looks at the definition of institutions, one finds many definitions. One of them is:  
an organization, establishment, foundation, society, or the like, devoted to the promotion of a 
particular cause or program, especially one of a public, educational, or charitable character. Another 
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definition that is given is: any established law, custom, etc.45 Both can be used in the context of the 
European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations but in this thesis, I will use the first 
definition. I will look at organizations within the European Union and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations and what they have done to promote a regional identity. There is a whole host of 
institutions that make up the European Union. Each one has its own specialization and they vary in 
the amount of power they have. The European Union institutions that are listed on the site of the 
organization are: European Parliament, European Council, Council of the European Union, European 
Commission, Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), European Central Bank (ECB), European 
Court of Auditors (ECA), European External Action Service (EEAS), European Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC), European Committee of the Regions (CoR), European Investment Bank (EIB), 
European Ombudsman, European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and Interinstitutional bodies.46 
Of all these institutions, only the European Economic and Social Committee is concerned with 
promoting an European identity and this is only one of the many things that this committee does.47  
The institutions of the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations are much more difficult to pin  
down. When one googles ASEAN Institutions and one follows the first link to the site of the 
organization, one lands on a page where seven institutions are presented that are only concerned 
with specific projects of economic integration. These seven institutions are: ASEAN Power Grid, 
Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline, Coal, Energy Efficiency and Conservation, New and Renewable Sources of 
Energy and Regional Energy Outlook, Energy Policy and Environmental Analysis. These institutions 
have been created to put a specific plan in action (the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation 
1999-2004). As the Association Of Southeast Asian has not integrated the region of Southeast Asia as 
far as the European Union has done with the majority of Europe, this may account for the lack of 
regional institutions. There are different communities that the Association Of Southeast Asian 
Nations has created that aim to accomplish in Southeast Asia what the institutions of the European 
Union try to accomplish in Europe. The Association Of Southeast Asian Nations is an institution if its 
communities are not. As these communities are extensions of the Association Of Southeast Asian 
Nations, the efforts of the institutions of the European Union and the communities of the Association 
Of Southeast Asian Nations can be compared. The three communities of the Association Of 
Southeast Asian Nations are: the ASEAN Socio – Cultural Community, the ASEAN Economic 
Community, and the ASEAN Political – Security Community. The ASEAN Political – Security 
Community aims to ‘ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the 
world in a just, democratic and harmonious environment.’48 The ASEAN Economic Community aims 
toward ‘achieving the vision of having an AEC by 2025 that is highly integrated and cohesive; 
competitive, innovative and dynamic; with enhanced connectivity and sectoral cooperation; and a 
more resilient, inclusive, and people-oriented, people-centered community, integrated with the 
global economy’.49 The ASEAN Socio – Cultural Community aims to ‘contribute to realizing an ASEAN 
Community that is people-oriented and socially responsible with a view to achieving enduring 
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solidarity and unity among the peoples and Member States of ASEAN. It seeks to forge a common 
identity and build a caring and sharing society which is inclusive and where the well-being, livelihood, 
and welfare of the peoples are enhanced.’50  
Now that I have talked about what I mean by institutions, I will now look at what these  
institutions have done to promote a regional identity. As can be read in the first part of this chapter, 
the ‘Other’ narrative is important in shaping regional identities. One would then assume that the 
institutions of the European Union and the institutions of the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations 
have used this narrative.  
How do we know that the European Union is interested in the promotion of a regional  
identity? According to a policy review that was published in 2013, the European Commission has 
concerned itself with ‘European identity/identities’ since the 1990s. As can be read in this review, the 
European Union is interested in European identity but does it want to promote it? In the same policy 
review, it is stated that the European Union has done multiple research projects that have looked at 
‘processes of identity formation and identification with(in) Europe and the EU.’ The review is used to 
‘presents key research findings and extracts policy implications.’ It is meant to help the European 
Commission with drafting policies by showing what the results from these research projects mean for 
the current policies.51   
The recommendations that the policy report gives are that ‘identification with Europe and  
fellow Europeans, could be fostered’ in two different ways. The first model that can be used is a 
‘Culturalist model’. This model is based on ‘core, established European values and their expression in 
public practices, most notably in governance and the operation of the legal system.’ This approach is 
top down. If the European Union uses this model, they will try to promote the European identity 
through ‘the exposure to influential discourses and symbols.’ The second model is the ‘Structuralist 
model.’ This model is based on the assumption that the sense of having a European identity can be 
fostered through ‘association with other Europeans.’ This model ‘emphasizes the importance of 
social interaction and posits mechanisms in which identification with Europe takes place ‘from the 
bottom up’. If the European Union decides to work with this model, they will work under the 
assumption that ‘Identity arises from interacting or associating with others’ and the realization that 
one has things in common with those others. This model is based on the process of othering. People 
realize they have a common identity because other people don’t share the same characteristics as 
they do. In the policy review, various researches done on the European identity at the European 
Commission’s request are divided based on these models.52  
Specific policy recommendations are not mentioned in the policy review. The  
recommendations that are given are ‘for the types of policy goals that could be pursued’, according 
to the report. Sometimes these types of policy goals are ‘coupled with suggestions about how these 
goals might be realized.’ The reasons why the report cannot give specific recommendations are 
three-fold. On the one hand, some of the research projects have not wrapped up yet and on the 
other hand, the communication between the different projects is bad. The third reason is that there 
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may be no explicit recommendations.53 In the policy report, it is also stated that the two different 
models resulted in different recommendations. According to the report, the ‘Structuralist projects’ 
conclusion is that ‘mundane everyday cross-border activities in popular cultural domains’ are more 
important to the promotion of a shared European identity than ‘focused EU programs’. The European 
Song Festival is more important to the promotion of an European identity than any programs that 
the European Union could come up with. The policy report does indicate that the European Union 
can help promote an shared European identity in some areas but that in this areas there already are 
European Union policies. Examples that are given are: the ‘deregulation of air travel coupled with the 
Schengen agreement’ and the introduction of a common currency. Due to the deregulation of air 
travel, travel and fares became cheaper and due to a common currency, people who travel to other 
European countries can compare the price of the things they buy with what they would spend if they 
bought it at home.54  
We can conclude by reading this policy that the European Union is interested in promoting a  
shared European identity but what are the specific things they have done? Did they base their 
policies and projects on the results of these research projects? I will not discuss the 
recommendations that were given by the researchers that conducted these research projects, as 
there are too many to incorporate in this thesis but when I look at projects that were started by the 
European Union institutions to promote a regional identity, I will also look at whether or not these 
projects may be based on recommendations in the policy report.  
One of the ways in which the institutions of the European Union has tried to promote an  
European identity is through ‘arts, youth and other events’. On the site of the European Union, on 
the section about the European Economic and Social Committee, this is given as the way that 
European Union citizens can get connected to the committee. The reason why these events are 
given, according to the site is to ‘bring the EU and its citizens closer together’.55 The concept of an 
European identity is not used but I do believe that this program is used to promote this identity. The 
European Union may be promoting the European identity without explicitly stating that they are 
doing so. They do not have to declare their goals to reach them.  
It has as its aim to bring the European Union and the citizens closer together. The European  
Union is trying with this program to make the citizens feel more connected with the organization. If 
they feel more connected with the organization, they may feel more European. The events that are 
grouped together as ‘arts, youth and other events’ are cultural events, traineeship, Open day, Social 
Media, Visit the EESC, Jobs, Mailing List, Your Europe Your Say!, Public procurement, Civil Society 
Prize, EESC video challenge and Bees are back in town.56 As can be read in the first section of this 
chapter, there is a theory among scholars that the sense of a regional identity can be developed 
through dialogue and interaction. Though interaction on different levels between citizens of different 
states, a regional identity can develop.  By organizing these events, there is interaction on different 
levels between European citizens. 
The focus of the Open Day of this year where the benefits of the European Union. What the  
European Union wanted to promote was the idea that countries are better off in the European Union 
rather than outside it.57 The focus was not to promote the idea that the people in European countries 
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should feel like they share an identity that is opposite from the rest of the world. The videos that 
were submitted for the EESC video challenge this year (2017) were created around the idea that 
European citizens are connected. The challenge that was issued was to ‘sing an interpretation of 
"Ode to Joy" using the original lyrics or their own based on a European theme and produce a creative 
video integrating their performance’. This European theme together with the word harmony in the 
title of the challenged has been interpreted as a wish for the participants to show the connection 
that European citizens have with each other. One could argue that this video challenge is used to 
promote an European identity. The videos had to be based on an European theme, not on a theme of 
individual countries or subjects like peace.58 This challenge seems to be the result of one of the 
recommendations in the policy report. It concerns the recommendation done by the research project 
‘Art Festivals and the European Public Culture’. The aim of this project was to ‘examine the role of 
festivals as sites of transnational identifications and international debate’. The recommendation that 
the researchers of this research project did was that the European Union should both be more 
present at art festivals or it should sponsor discussions about the role of the EU with reference to 
topical subjects as addressed by specific artistic productions.’ The report of this research project 
emphasizes the importance of the bottom-up aspect of the art festival that the European Union 
should finance or support.59 The video challenge is not bottom-up, as it is organized by the European 
Union itself but the organization may have used the conclusion that art is important to the 
development of an European identity and created this challenge. As can be read above, most of the 
research projects believe that popular culture plays an important part in the promotion of an shared 
European identity.  
Now that I have looked at what the European Union has done to promote a regional identity,  
I will now look at what the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations has done to promote a regional 
identity. In the ASEAN Vision 2020 section of the site of the organization, it is stated that they aim, by 
2020 to be, by an ‘ASEAN community conscious of its ties of history, aware of its cultural heritage 
and bound by a common regional identity.’ This shows us that the Association Of Southeast Asian 
Nations is interested in promoting a regional identity. But in the sentence directly beneath it, it is 
stated that they want the member states to remain connected with their national identities. This is 
probably because of the non-interference clause that is an important part of the founding document 
of the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations.60 If national identity is as important to the Association 
Of Southeast Asian Nations as the regional identity, one would assume that the organization has 
done less to promote the regional identity of Southeast Asia then the European Union has done for 
the promotion of an European identity, as this organization is mostly interested in the promotion of 
the European identity.  
According to an essay written by Dira T. Fabrian, the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations  
has tried to promote the idea of a shared Southeast Asian identity by ‘placing the ASEAN Community 
on top of their domestic agenda, and as ‘”the cornerstone of their foreign policy”’.61 This essay does 
not give us specifics on what the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations has done to promote a 
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regional identity. Another essay that discusses the Southeast Asian identity and the way in which the 
Association Of Southeast Asian Nations has tried to promote this regional identity was written by 
Venessa Parekh. According to her, the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations has tried to promote 
the Southeast Asian identity by creating the three communities that I have discussed above. They are 
regional institutions created specifically to promote the regional identity. In Farbian’s opinion, these 
communities are ‘all talk and not enough action’. On the one hand, the non-interference principle is 
to blame for this but also the vast amounts of paperwork.  
An article that was posted on the site of the Vietnamese university Dai Hoc looks at the  
‘Master Plan for the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community’ that was implemented from 2009 to 2015. 
Parts of this master plan were ‘[d]etails for building a regional identity’. These details were ‘strategic 
objective[s]’.  The strategic objectives were as follows:  ‘[r]eview and develop a new Regional and 
National Communication Plan in each Member State to support ASEAN identity and awareness 
building efforts’; encourage all sectorial bodies to intensify their efforts in promoting ASEAN identity 
and awareness as well as enhance the roles of Senior Ofﬁcials Responsible for Information 
(“SOMRI”), Senior Ofﬁcials Meeting on Culture and Arts (“SOMCA”) and the ASEAN Committee on 
Culture and Information (“COCI”) in promoting ASEAN identity and awareness; undertake a 
coordinated production of printed, broadcast and multimedia materials on ASEAN to be reproduced 
and disseminated by national information agencies and private agencies of ASEAN Member States 
starting in 2009; engage the mainstream media in promoting, on a continuing basis, all ASEAN 
programmes and projects, including ASEAN’s cultural heritage and arts and the work of COCI; 
increase media exchange and networking of communication personnel among ASEAN Member 
States and between ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners; support school activities promoting ASEAN 
awareness, such as by encouraging the observance of the annual ASEAN Day; initiate the 
establishment of linkages among ASEAN cities and townships, especially those with cultural arts and 
heritage elements; support the ASEAN Foundation’s mandate to promote ASEAN identity and 
awareness and people-to-people interactions, primarily within ASEAN, but also between ASEAN and 
its friends and partners; promote ASEAN sporting events in the national and private media such as 
the SEA Games. and PARA Games; encourage the use of ASEAN Anthem and other ASEAN Symbols to 
raise ASEAN awareness in ASEAN Member States; encourage the establishment of ASEAN 
associations at national levels to promote awareness of ASEAN in ASEAN Member States; encourage 
the deepening of understanding and tolerance among the peoples of ASEAN through interfaith 
dialogue and ensuring adequate exposure of these events in the media; disseminate ASEAN culture, 
social traditions and values particularly among the young generation through the media; promote 
exchanges of television programmes to enhance cross-culture understanding among ASEAN Member 
States;  mobilise the mass media and other cultural institutions to disseminate and share information 
on ASEAN culture, developments, accomplishments, beneﬁts, and objectives to the people; 
encourage youth exchanges such as the conduct of youth camps and similar activities to promote 
ASEAN arts and culture performances, ASEAN awareness and a sense of community among the 
public, and include the studies on ASEAN arts and culture as well as their values in school 
curriculum.62 
According to an article written by Carlson B. Alelis in March 2017, the Association of  
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Southeast Asian Nations has a plan to promote the ASEAN identity. The organization wants the 
citizens of the member states to be aware of the benefits of living in a member state of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The project is called ‘the ASEAN Strategic Plan for 
Information and Media’ and they plan to implement and it will run from 2016-2025. The project has 
already started. This project has the ‘key strategies’ that will help the member states to cooperate to 
promote the ASEAN identity.63 This ASEAN identity is more centered around the benefits of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations than the sense of living in a shared region but a Southeast 
Asian identity may develop from an ASEAN identity. As can be read above, there are theories about 
the formation of regional identities that state that regional identities are created through the 
interaction between states and citizens on multiple political levels.  
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations had quite a few aims it wanted to accomplish, the  
question now is what they have done to reach these goals. The article looks at this too. According to 
Tran Xuan Hiep, the author of the article, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has established 
the organization ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Culture & Arts (AMCA). This organization is 
responsible for setting forth ‘guidelines for cooperation in culture and arts among ASEAN countries; 
promoted cultural exchanges to enhance understanding about each other’s cultures among ASEAN 
Member States; implemented the enhancement of ASEAN studies programme for different 
educational levels in ASEAN Members States; promoted ASEAN’s existence in ASEAN Member States 
(this resulted in ASEAN day) and convinced countries that were part of the ASEAN+3 to help promote 
the Southeast Asian regional identity.’64  
As I have stated when I discussed the regional institutions of the Association Of Southeast  
Asian Nations, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community has as its main goal is to ‘contribute to realizing 
an ASEAN Community that is people-oriented and socially responsible with a view to achieving 
enduring solidarity and unity among the peoples and Member States of ASEAN. It seeks to forge a 
common identity and build a caring and sharing society which is inclusive and where the well-being, 
livelihood, and welfare of the peoples are enhanced.’65 This community does not come with ‘specific 
rules and practices from above’ because its power comes from ‘the degree of group cohesion rather 
than in the instruments of coercion’.66  
There have been suggestions on what future projects the Association Of Southeast Asian  
Nations should embark on in the future. In the article ‘Could ASEAN form a common identity?’, which 
was written by Leong Wai Kit and Kimberly Spykerman for Channel NewsAsia in 2016, suggestions 
are given. The first suggestion is that the different groups – ‘from civil society to political groups’ - 
talk more to one another. This is already happening. If these groups talk with each other there will be 
‘more understanding on the ground of what a certain political decision means for the citizen or what 
implication or impact a certain agreement or declaration that the ASEAN heads of state and 
government issue has on the ground at the national level.’ Another suggestion is that through 
‘sports, art and entrepreneurship […] exchanges between the ASEAN countries’ can take place and 
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this will increase the sense of being a part of a region. Through competition, people will create 
bonds.67  
Fabrian makes some suggestions in the essay for establishing a regional identity. According to  
her, the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations should ‘foster equitable growth’. If they do this, it 
will have a ‘trickle-down effect to the society level.’ It will make people feel like they benefit from the 
presence of the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations. Another suggestion is an ‘ASEAN narrative’. 
This narrative should be shared through the ‘education system of member countries.’ It will make 
people feel like they have a shared ‘historical memory’. The third suggestion that Fabrian makes is 
that ‘media and popular culture could also be used as instruments to foster greater awareness of the 
sense of the ASEAN Community.’68   
 
Identity of the People  
 
As can be seen in the previous chapters, the regional institutions of the European Union and  
Association Of Southeast Asian Nations both have tried to promote a regional identity but have their 
attempts been successful? Do the people living in the region feel like they have an European or 
Southeast Asian identity? Is the sense of belonging or the lack thereof due to projects of the regional 
institutions or may there be other explanations? 
The article ‘Explaining variation in sub-state regional identities in Western Europe’ by Rune  
Dahl Fitjar looks at why people living in certain regions in Europe feel more connected to their 
European identity than people living in other regions. According to Fitjar, regional identities are 
stronger in regions where people speak a regional language and also in ‘economically developed 
regions’ and in regions with ‘highly distinctive voting behavior.’ This research only looks at West-
European countries.69 In non-West-European countries the reasons why there is a stronger European 
identity in some countries then others may be different.  
The European Union itself also has done research to find out in how far the citizens of the  
Union feel connected to the European Union. According to the site of the European Commission, 
‘[e]ach survey consists of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per country’ and the ‘[r]eports 
are published twice yearly’. There are two types of surveys that are conducted. The first types are 
‘Special Eurobarometer reports’, which are based on ‘in-depth thematic studies carried out for 
various services of the European Commission or other EU Institutions and integrated in the Standard 
Eurobarometer's polling waves.’ The second type of surveys are ‘Flash Eurobarometer’ which are ‘ad 
hoc thematic telephone interviews conducted at the request of any service of the European 
Commission.’70 These surveys have a far range of topics. One of the surveys that were conducted in 
2016 had as its subject European Union citizenship. The participants were asked about their 
‘awareness of their status as citizens of the European Union, their awareness of their rights and of 
what they can do if these are not respected, the economic benefits of free movement within the 
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European Union;  seeking help from other EU embassies while staying in an EU country and voting 
rights when residing in other EU countries’. The results of these surveys are published per country. 
There are fact sheets that show the results of the responses of the participants of specific member 
states. This is the case with every survey result that the European Union publishes. According to the 
result report of these surveys, only ‘four in ten respondents (42%) say they feel informed […]about 
their rights as citizens of the European Union’.71  Around two in five participants consider themselves 
well-informed about their rights as European Union citizens. The rights they are the most familiar 
with are ‘their right to free movement and their right to petition key EU institutions’. 72 Other rights 
that a majority is aware of are: ‘The right to non-discrimination (77%), the right to consular 
protection (72%) and the right to participate in a Citizens’ Initiative (66%). 73  Only a minority 
(14%) is aware that they do not have the right to ‘seek help from the embassy of another EU country, 
if they were staying in an EU country where their own country does not have an embassy.’ Only a 
minority (26%) is aware of what they can do if their rights are not respected.  By looking at the 
results of the surveys, one can see that most of the people have heard of the term citizens of the EU 
but they feel like they are less aware of the rights they have as an European citizen. 74   
One of the questions in another survey that was published in December 2016 is if the  
participant feels that they are a citizen of the EU. According to the report that is based on the results 
of these surveys, a majority of participants (67%) consider themselves European Union citizens.  Of 
this 67%, 53% of Europeans see themselves as citizens of their nationality first and an European 
citizen second. The percentage of people who see themselves as European citizens first and citizens 
of their own country second is 6%. Only 2% see themselves as European only. The report also shows 
the results of a socio-demographic analysis of the participants. In almost all socio-demographic 
categories, the majority consider themselves European citizens.  The socio-demographic category of 
people who struggle to pay the bill is the only exception.75  
The Association Of Southeast Asian Nations has also done a survey to find out what people in  
the Southeast Asian region think about ASEAN citizenship. A survey about the ASEAN identity was 
conducted in 2007. The participants of these surveys were students and seventy-five percent of them 
agreed with the statement ‘I am a citizen of ASEAN’. But students are more educated about politics 
than the average citizen living within the region. According to an article ‘a study [was] released by 
the ASEAN Secretariat which found that ‘three out of four people (76 percent) “lack a basic 
understanding” of what ASEAN is and what it is striving to do.’76 
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Comparing methods of the regional institutions  
 
Now that I have looked at the methods that the regional institutions of the European Union  
and the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations have used to promote and create a regional identity, 
I want to look at the difference between the methods.  
The European Union and the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations are at different stages  
of integration. The European Union has introduced a common currency while the Association Of 
Southeast Asian Nations does not intervene in its member states because it does not want to wave 
the non-intervention clause. So why compare the methods of these very different organizations? 
One of the main reasons is that both organizations want to promote their regional identity. Another 
reason is that it is interesting to compare the strategy used by two regional organizations that are 
not at the same level of integration.  
Both regional organizations may want to promote a regional identity but it is the European  
Union who has more projects in the work that are meant to promote a regional identity. There is the 
video challenge and the Open Day. They have also tasked researchers with finding out how they can 
best promote a European identity. The Association Of Southeast Asian Nations, on the other hand, 
has had one project in the past and currently only one project in the works.  
The ‘ASEAN Strategic Plan for Information and Media’ has four key strategies: 1, Advancing  
cooperation and ASEAN-level agreements to provide regional mechanisms to promote access to 
information; 2, Encouraging the development of programs and dissemination of information on the 
benefits and opportunities offered by the ASEAN community and promote mutual respect, 
appreciation of diversity and a sense of belonging in this integrated region; 3, Harnessing the use of 
information and communication technologies across different groups as a means to connect with the 
regional and global community; and 4, Engaging media professionals, research, business and other 
entities in collaborative development of ASEAN-relevant content.77 It aims to provide information. 
This is not so different from what the European Union tries to do with its Open Day.  
It seems both regional organizations believe that providing information on the organization  
itself and its benefits, will help with the creation of their respective regional identities. The European 
Union also uses art to make people feel like they have a shared regional identity and the Association 
Of Southeast Asian Nations has used culture and media to make people aware of the Association Of 
Southeast Asian Nations’ benefits. Suggestions have been made that the Association Of Southeast 
Asian Nations should use art, among other things, as well to promote the Southeast Asian identity. 
The European Union, in turn, has been recommended to make more use of art as well as other 
strategies. Both organizations do not do enough to promote the regional identity, according to 
researchers and journalists.  
 
Conclusion  
 
I have looked at regional identities and the parts that intuitions have played in creating and  
promoting them. Can we attribute the successes and failures of these institutions to the methods 
that they used to promote a Southeast Asian and European identity?  
There is a range of theories about the rise of regionalism. Some of these theories incorporate  
the idea of othering while others emphasize the communication between the different groups and 
political levels that make up the region.  When looking at the development of the regional identity in 
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Europe and Southeast Asia, communication also plays an important part. All the scholars who I have 
discussed in the quest for regional identity chapter of this thesis are of the opinion that 
communication is the key to the European identity. There are also scholars that values that were 
created within the Roman Empire in combination with Christianity have shaped the European 
identity. Communication is not the only tool with which the regional identity in Southeast Asia was 
created, according to the other group of scholars I have discussed in the same chapter. The 
experiences of the elites in the region have had an important part in the creation of a Southeast 
Asian identity, according to one scholar, while another believes that this identity emerged because 
the region wanted to distinguish itself from Japan, China, and India.  
For this thesis, I have looked at what the institutions of the European Union and the  
institutions of the Association Of Southeast Asian have done to promote a regional identity. I have 
looked at what the European Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
ASEAN Socio – Cultural Community have done to raise awareness of the shared identity among the 
citizens of their member states. The institutions of the European Union have set up research projects 
to find out how best to promote a regional awareness, they hold an Open Day during which citizens 
can come to Brussels to find out more about the European Union and how it works and they also 
issue video challenges to promote regional identity awareness. They are also both used culture to 
promote regional identities. The European institutions use art and the Association Of Southeast Asian 
Nations institutions use culture and media.  
The Association Of Southeast Asian Nations has implemented a plan to promote regional  
identity in the past and have implement one more recently in 2015. The plan they have implemented 
in the past was based around the concept of culture. They tried to use culture to raise awareness of 
the benefits of living in a member state of the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations. The plan that 
they implemented in 2015 has the same strategy.  The plan they implemented in the past has 
resulted in the organization ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Culture & Arts (AMCA). This 
organization has as its responsibility to promote the Southeast Asian regional identity through 
culture.  
Both regional organizations center their strategy around the concept that knowledge will  
lead to a sense of community. The European Union has also used art while the Association Of 
Southeast Asian Nations has used culture and the media as their second and third tool.  
The strategies used by the European Union and the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations  
may have led to some extent to more regional awareness in their respective region. At first glance, 
the European Union appears to have been more successful than the Association Of Southeast Asian 
Nations. In Southeast Asia, 76 percent of the people living in the region are not aware what ASEAN is 
and what it tries to do. The people living in the European Union are aware of the existence of citizens 
of the EU. I do not believe the reason why the regional awareness is more widespread in the 
European Union than in Southeast Asia is because of the strategies they used as the strategies of the 
two different regional organization are very similar. Both organizations use the strategy of providing 
information to promote their respective regional identities.  
My hypotheses when I started to write this thesis was that the institutions of the European  
Union and the institutions of the  Association Of Southeast Asian Nations have tried to promote a 
regional identity but have been unsuccessful.  As can be read in the Identity of the People’ section of 
this thesis, 67 percent of the people that the European Commission asked if they feel like an EU 
citizens, they said yes. When looking at that number, the European Union seems quite successful at 
promoting the European identity. The problem is however that we do not know who these people 
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are. It can be that the European Union has the same problem as the Association Of Southeast Asian 
Nations, namely that the people who have an awareness of the regional identity are mostly people 
belonging to the elite. Like I discussed in the European section of the quest for regional identity 
chapter of this thesis, there are studies that show that people with a higher education are more likely 
to have a positive attitude towards Europe. But as can be concluded from the results of the survey, 
two-thirds feel like they are European. As the elites in Europe do not make up two-thirds of the 
population, one could conclude that the elites may be more positive towards Europe, but they are 
not the only ones who feel European. This may be because the people who have no higher education 
do not feel like they have a shared identity with people living within other European countries. I think 
it can be said that the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations has not been successful at the 
promotion of a regional identity but whether or not the same goes for the European Union, is not so 
easily said.  
But was the high percentage of people who feel they are European Union citizens because of  
the projects that were launched by the European Union? The first Open Day was held in 1996. The 
first video challenge was issued in 2012. If these projects were successful with the promotion of the 
European identity, the percentage of people who identify themselves as European Union citizens 
would have increased after these years. The first year that the institutions of the European Union 
held surveys was in 1995. Already in the survey of the Standard Eurobarometer of 1996, participants 
are asked if they see themselves as European and ‘nationality’ or only European. The percentage of 
people who felt ‘nationality plus European’ was 46%. The people who felt European first and second 
their nationality was 6%. Only 5% identified themselves as European only.78 This puts the total 
percentage of people who feel that they are European at 57%. A survey issued in 2003 to ask about 
the European identity. According to the report of this survey, 57% of ‘EU citizens see themselves as 
to some extent European in a near future’. It is noted that this is a 2% drop compared with the 
results of the survey of Autumn 2002. In this report, a distinction is also made between feeling only 
European, European first and citizens of their own country second and feeling citizens of their own 
country first and European second. In 2003, the percentage of people feeling citizens of their own 
country first has dropped to 44%, the percentage of people feeling European first has increased to 
8%. The people who only feel European has dropped to 4%.79 It seems that the Open Days did not 
help with making European Union citizens feel European. The report of the Standard Eurobarometer 
of 2013 states that 54% of Europeans see themselves as ‘European citizens’.  This is less than the 
percentage of people who considered themselves European in 2003. Of the 54%, 47% feel citizens of 
their own country first, 5% feels that are both citizens of their own country and 2% feels European 
only.80 The percentage of participants that see themselves as European Union citizens is higher, 
59%.81 As can be read in the ‘Identity of the People’ chapter, the percentage of people who consider 
themselves as European  Union citizens has increased to 67% in 2016. The people who feel European 
and/or citizens of their own country is 61% in 2016. In the same year, the percentage of people who 
felt citizens of their own country first and European second is 53%. This is a higher percentage than in 
2013. The percentage of the people who feel European first is 6% in 2016. This is less than it was in 
2003. The people who feel they are European only is 2%. This percentage seems constant. The total 
percentage of people who consider themselves as European or think they will in the future has 
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changed over the years. The Open Days do not seem to have influenced the number. It is possible 
that the video challenge may have had influence.  
The first challenge was issued in 2012, in 2013, the percentage of people that felt that they  
were European citizens was 54%, which is lower than the 57% of 2003. However, the 57% is the 
percentage of people who feel that they will feel European in the future while the 54% are the 
people who feel European at the moment they take the survey. The question is if you can compare 
the two percentages because of it. I do not think so, as it measures two different things. In 2016, 61% 
felt European citizens and/or citizens of their own country. This percentage is higher than the 
percentage of people who felt this way in 2003 or 1996. These numbers seem to indicate that the 
Video challenged may have had an influence on whether or not people feel European. This may 
indeed be the case but that does not mean that the video challenge is the only method used by the 
European Union institutions that have helped to promote a regional identity. Or that things other 
than these methods have influenced the regional identity formation.  
As for the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations,  their project took place from 2009 to  
2015. There was a survey conducted amongst students, but this survey was held in 2007 before the 
project started. The study that is mentioned in the article that was written in 2013 was conducted in 
2011. It measures how many people know what the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations. It shows 
that a large percentage of people is aware of the regional organization. It appears that the 
organization has not been successful with regional awareness.   
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